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Abstract
Sustaining elimination of malaria in areas with high receptivity and vulnerability will require effective strategies to prevent
reestablishment of local transmission, yet there is a dearth of evidence about this phase. Mauritius offers a uniquely
informative history, with elimination of local transmission in 1969, re-emergence in 1975, and second elimination in 1998.
Towards this end, Mauritius’s elimination and prevention of reintroduction (POR) programs were analyzed via a
comprehensive review of literature and government documents, supplemented by program observation and interviews
with policy makers and program personnel. The impact of the country’s most costly intervention, a passenger screening
program, was assessed quantitatively using simulation modeling. On average, Mauritius spent $4.43 per capita per year
(pcpy) during its second elimination campaign from 1982 to 1988. The country currently spends $2.06 pcpy on its POR
program that includes robust surveillance, routine vector control, and prompt and effective treatment and response. Thirty-
five percent of POR costs are for a passenger screening program. Modeling suggests that the estimated 14% of imported
malaria infections identified by this program reduces the annual risk of indigenous transmission by approximately 2%. Of
cases missed by the initial passenger screening program, 49% were estimated to be identified by passive or reactive case
detection, leaving an estimated 3.1 unidentified imported infections per 100,000 inhabitants per year. The Mauritius
experience indicates that ongoing intervention, strong leadership, and substantial predictable funding are critical to
consistently prevent the reestablishment of malaria. Sustained vigilance is critical considering Mauritius’s enabling
conditions. Although the cost of POR is below that of elimination, annual per capita spending remains at levels that are
likely infeasible for countries with lower overall health spending. Countries currently embarking on elimination should
quantify and plan for potentially similar POR operations and costs.
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Introduction
Recently, a growing number of countries have experienced
dramatic reductions in malaria transmission and have set short-term
goals for elimination [1]. Among this group are a number of
countries in sub-Saharan Africa and other regions where baseline
malaria transmission is high [1]. Several countries, including
Morocco, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates, have recently
achieved elimination and others are on the verge of doing so [2].
The recent surge of interest in and pursuit of elimination requires a
close examination of post-elimination, or prevention of reintroduc-
tion (POR), activities. While recent recommendations suggest that
countries should thoroughly assess the feasibility of preventing
reintroduction prior to embarking on a serious elimination effort
[3], many outstanding questions surrounding malaria elimination
and POR remain. What is the cost structure of successful
elimination and POR programs? Can malaria-free status be
maintained in areas with an efficient vector and frequent
importation of new cases? What is an effective combination of
interventions to sustain elimination?
Despite the fact that several countries have been actively
preventing the reintroduction of malaria over the past several
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decades [2], there continues to be a dearth of evidence about this
phase. POR was considered only superficially during the Global
Malaria Eradication Program (GMEP) since a global campaign by
definition implied that importation and resurgence were not of
significant concern. Since then, most evidence generated has
focused on control in high endemic areas or the process of
interrupting transmission [4,5]. As a result, only a limited
empirical foundation is available today to guide strategic
decision-making in countries that may successfully achieve
elimination without the benefit of their neighbors and the wider
malaria endemic world doing the same.
To help close this evidence gap, the elimination and prevention
of reintroduction experience on the island nation of Mauritius was
closely analyzed. The Republic of Mauritius consists of several
reefed islands in the Indian Ocean, including the larger populated
islands of Mauritius and Rodrigues with a total population of
1,288,000 in 2009 [6]. The islands experience subtropical climate
year round and heavy rainfall from December to May during the
hot, wet summer with frequent and often destructive cyclones [7].
Total expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP in 2009 was
5.7% [6].
Plasmodium vivax and Plasmodium falciparum and their vectors,
Anopheles funestus and Anopheles arabiensis, were most likely imported
into Mauritius by ships with slaves and indentured laborers
arriving from malaria-endemic East Africa and South Asia during
colonization from early 1800 to 1860 [8]. In 1867, a violent
malaria epidemic erupted in Mauritius that resulted in 40,000
deaths of a population 330,000, with 6,000 deaths occurring in just
one month in urban Port Louis [9]. Mauritius was globally
notorious for its malariousness after the epidemic, making the
achievement of elimination that much more remarkable more
than 100 years later [8].
Mauritius’s experience is well suited to generate lessons for the
current wave of countries today that are pursuing or considering
elimination. It is one of only two sub-Saharan African countries to
have fully eliminated malaria and has historically faced malaria
transmission equivalent to many mainland countries [10].
Mauritius, a country that interrupted local transmission in 1969,
saw it reemerge in 1975, and once again ended transmission in
1998, continues to receive high volumes of travelers from malaria
endemic countries despite its relative isolation.
This paper examines the history of malaria elimination in
Mauritius, with a particular focus on the country’s POR programs.
The composition and costs of both elimination and POR
programs are analyzed and the impact of its single most costly
component, a passenger screening program, is examined quanti-
tatively to provide evidence on its effectiveness and cost-efficiency.
Finally, recommendations are presented based on the Mauritius
experience to inform decision-making in other countries embark-
ing on malaria elimination.
Methods
Literature review and interviews
To identify all available information on the history of malaria
epidemiology, control, and elimination in Mauritius, a systematic
literature review was conducted. PubMed (United States National
Library of Medicine), OVID (Ovid Technologies, Inc.), and
Google Scholar databases were searched using the keywords
‘‘malaria’’, ‘‘Mauritius’’, and ‘‘eradication’’ or ‘‘elimination.’’
Relevant citations contained in resulting publications were also
included, as well as published government and WHO reports and
digitized books. In addition, all gray literature available at the
National Archives, Health Statistics Unit, Mauritius Institute of
Health, and Communicable Disease Control Unit (CDCU) of the
Ministry of Health and Quality of Life was searched for reference
to malaria, malaria control, or elimination. Only literature dated
from 1860, the time of emergence of malaria in Mauritius, was
included in the review. All narratives, health statistics, and
financial budgets related to malaria in Mauritius were extracted
from this subset of reports and publications and compiled for
analysis by AT.
Direct observation of ongoing surveillance and vector control
activities furnished additional insights, and visits to major
implementing institutions in Mauritius and the ports of entry
allowed closer examination of the passenger screening program.
Further information was collected through approximately 50
interviews using semi-structured questionnaires with key technical
experts, policy makers, and operational personnel from past and
present malaria programs. All individuals were purposively
selected based on their professional affiliation in public health,
most of whom had current or past involvement in malaria
financing, program management, or implementation. Information
was verified through document review, and, when possible, from
additional individuals with identical rank and responsibility.
Program costing
All identified costs from budgets, technical reports, and program
reviews were allocated to specific activities within four main
intervention categories – surveillance and diagnosis; treatment;
prevention; and management. Within each activity, costs were
classified as personnel, consumables, capital equipment, training,
or services.
Comprehensive costing data were available for both elimination
campaigns, 1948–1951 and 1982–1988. Costs were also available
for 1960–1961, 1990–1991, and 2008. Although local transmission
was not interrupted until 1968 and re-interrupted until 1998,
interventions and strategies in 1960 and 1990 were very similar to
those during POR. Malaria incidence had virtually reached zero
during these years [11,12] and strategies were in place that
continued until reemergence (1975) [13] and through the early
1990s [14]. Therefore, costs for these two years and for 2008 are
considered representative of POR and are analyzed as such in this
paper.
Personnel costs for 1949–1961 were collected from the National
Accounts and the Mauritius Blue Book of budget salary estimates
[15,16] and supplemented by technical reports [7,17]. These same
sources for later years omitted substantial expenditures, i.e., travel
and overtime that contributed between 20% and 50% to
personnel costs beyond basic salary [18,19]. Thus, complete
personnel costs for the 1980s were extrapolated based on fiscal
year 1990/1991 when more comprehensive data were available
[18,20] verified by program staff employed at the time using an
average annual inflation rate between 1982/1983 and 1987/1988
of 4.7% [21] and assuming a constant annual change in salaries.
Costs for 2008 were collected from a number of finance and
implementing institutions within the Ministry of Health and
Quality of Life, including the Finance Section, Communicable
Disease Control Unit, Central Health Laboratory Malaria
Section, Vector Biology and Control Division, and the Procure-
ment Section.
This analysis included only malaria-specific costs (i.e. excluding
general health system resources). Thus time spent on malaria-
related activities per person per grade was estimated since the
malaria program was integrated into the health system at various
points throughout elimination and POR. Two methods were used
to identify all personnel costs: interviews with current and former
staff on the average number of hours or days spent on malaria
Preventing Reintroduction of Malaria in Mauritius
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each week, and review of narratives in technical reports from the
recent elimination campaign.
Costs beyond personnel were derived from reports of actual
expenditures and prospective budgets. Approximately 40% of
these costs for elimination was actual expenditure reported
subsequent to implementation, while remaining costs were
prospective estimates found in program budgets. All costing data
for the current POR program includes actual expenditure.
Straight-line amortization was used for capital equipment and
all costs were apportioned among activities based on the judgment
of local staff for recent costs or reports from past programs. All
costs were indexed to the year 2008 using local GDP deflators for
Mauritius [22] and then converted to USD [23,24].
Assessing the impact of surveillance measures
A quantitative analysis was conducted to understand the impact
of the interventions implemented and estimate the risk averted by
the current POR program in Mauritius. The risk of renewed local
transmission following elimination is dependent upon two
principal factors: the rate at which new infections are imported,
and the probability of those infections leading to onwards
transmission [25]. Estimating the probability of onward transmis-
sion – best expressed in terms of the basic reproductive number,
R0 [26]–is made extremely challenging in Mauritius by the long
absence of malaria transmission from the islands; relying on
estimates from many decades in the past is problematic due to
changes in socioeconomic status, environment, and vectors [27].
As such, a range of values for this parameter was considered for
this analysis.
Existing comprehensive surveillance data enabled detailed
consideration of the rate at which infections are imported. The
number of infections detected by current measures was summed
from proactive case detection (passenger screening), passive case
detection, and reactive case detection records [28] [see Table 1 for
definitions]. Some infections may have been missed by all of these
case detection methods so the number of unidentified cases was
estimated. Passengers arriving in Mauritius are screened proac-
tively if they are febrile and/or have a recent travel history of
being in a malaria endemic country [31]. Malaria cases thus may
be missed at the ports of entry if they do not display fever, if their
travel history is incomplete or inaccurate, or if the sensitivity of
microscopy is imperfect. Cases may then be identified through
passive or reactive case detection. Combining assumptions about
each of these three variables – the fraction of cases that are
asymptomatic, the fraction that have incomplete travel histories,
and the sensitivity of microscopy – with records of the fraction of
incoming passengers who meet the criteria for screening but who
are either untraceable or do not require testing (only passengers
who are symptomatic at some point during the 42-day surveillance
period are tested), permitted calculation of the number of cases
missed by this screening approach according to the following
equation, derived from a simple decision-tree model:
% cases missed~1{ars tzf{tfð Þ
Where
a = the fraction of those who meet the passenger screening
criteria who cannot be located for follow up (5.5%, per 2008 data
[32])
r = the fraction of those who meet the passenger screening
criteria who were located and followed up but not tested (75.4%,
per 2008 data [32])
s = the percent sensitivity of microscopy (a range of values
estimated from literature [33])
t = the unknown fraction of incoming passengers with malaria
for whom an accurate travel history is recorded
f = the unknown fraction of incoming passengers with malaria
who are febrile
Because values s, t and f are unknown, distributions for each
were assumed. The fraction of cases with fever was allowed to vary
across a wide uniform distribution of 10–80% to reflect the great
uncertainty in this estimate, while the fraction of infected
individuals with complete travel histories was assumed to follow
a narrower uniform distribution ranging from 80–100%; sensitiv-
ity analyses demonstrated that the model was largely insensitive to
both of these values. Finally, the sensitivity of microscopy was
estimated to follow a normal distribution with mean 70% and
SD=10%. The mean value was calculated by combining
estimates of microscopy sensitivity from a recent review [33] with
a weighted average of the prevalence of malaria at the origin of
recorded imported cases from 2005–2008. Values were picked at
random for each variable from these three distributions in 99,999
Monte Carlo simulations, and the average fraction of cases missed
and its 95% confidence interval were calculated from the resulting
distribution of outcomes.
Simulating the importance of missed cases for
prevention of reintroduction
The impact of current passenger screening on preventing
reemergence of malaria in Mauritius was examined through
application of an individual-based, spatially-explicit, stochastic
simulation model that has been described elsewhere [34]. This
model requires specification of the importation rate per 1,000
inhabitants per year; RC, the number of malaria cases resulting
from each case given ongoing control [35]; and the fraction of
cases rapidly identified and treated by the health system. First,
transmission was simulated using an importation rate derived from
the number of infections estimated to be missed by the current
screening program, and second, with a higher importation rate
corresponding to the expected rate if no passenger screening was
conducted. Because RC is unknown for Mauritius, this parameter
was varied in each case from 0–0.5, a range of values consistent
with the island’s demonstrated lack of local transmission over the
past decade. The number of infections estimated to be missed by
both the passenger screening program and subsequent passive and
reactive case detection was used to derive the case detection rate.
For each scenario, 1,000 1-year simulations were run, and the
fraction of those iterations in which indigenous (that is, not
imported nor introduced) malaria occurred was tallied to produce
an annual risk.
Results
The review identified approximately 543 publications on
malaria in Mauritius in the peer-reviewed literature as well as
Government of Mauritius, Ministry of Health and Quality of Life,
and World Health Organization reports on the incidence of
malaria, financing of the control program, and coverage with
interventions for the years 1855 to 2008. From these, a subset of
61 particularly comprehensive accounts of malaria incidence and
control were selected for summary here. This literature includes 12
publications and/or reports providing comprehensive data on
reported malaria incidence over time; six which provide a
complete accounting of costs for the years 1948–1951, 1962,
1981–1988, 1992, and 2008; 19 Ministry of Health reports
detailing the interventions implemented from 1945 to 2008; five
WHO reports on the most recent elimination campaign; and 19
Preventing Reintroduction of Malaria in Mauritius
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publications on the global malaria elimination dialogue and
costing methods.
Thirty percent of the semi-structured in-depth interviews took
place with high level administrative and technical personnel in the
Ministry of Health and Quality of Life; 50% with implementing
officers at both the national and district levels; 15% with retired
experts formerly involved in communicable disease control; and
the remaining with officers from external agencies. Respondents
provided information on roles and responsibilities of the human
resource infrastructure for current and past malaria programs and
on time-spent on malaria-related activities that supported the
costing analysis conducted in this paper. Respondents further
provided narratives on the challenges and successes of past and
current malaria programs.
Elimination, 1948–1968
Following the introduction of malaria to Mauritius in the 1860s
[36], the disease became highly endemic in the island, with
parasite rates (65% in school children and 38% in the general
population in 1946 [10]) similar to those in many high-burden
mainland countries [2]. Anopheles funestus was a highly efficient
vector during this period but has not been detected since cessation
of the first elimination campaign from 1948–1952 with wide scale
use of DDT (dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane) [37]. Since then,
An. arabiensis remains the only malaria vector in Mauritius.
Figure 1 describes epidemiological, meteorological and pro-
grammatic trends between 1948 and 2008. From 1948 to 1952,
Mauritius conducted an aggressive campaign to eliminate malaria
through indoor residual spraying (IRS) with DDT – the strategy
deployed by the GMEP [8] – protecting more than 70% of the
island. In just four years, malaria incidence dropped from 105
cases per 1,000 population to 2.6 cases per 1,000 population. The
program subsequently shifted from blanket spraying to targeted
spraying of active and residual foci. Surveillance was strengthened
by establishing a Mobile Malaria Squad, the country’s first active
case detection system that reactively screened contacts of malaria
cases and proactively conducted fever surveys [17]. A spike in
cases in 1960 was likely the result of the introduction of this mobile
squad and a change in surveillance strategy when screening shifted
from mass blood to fever surveys, a more sensitive system for case
detection. Local malaria transmission was interrupted in 1969, and
Mauritius received malaria-free certification by the WHO in 1973
[38].
Prevention of reintroduction, 1969–1974
In 1968, the malaria unit was integrated into the preventive
division of the health system [39], as was the malaria laboratory in
1969 [40], which resulted in reduction in full-time equivalents
(FTEs) dedicated to malaria-related activities [13]. To reduce the
risk of resurgence, the program continued to conduct vector
control activities between 1969 and 1974, including routine island-
wide larviciding and DDT spraying at the ports of entry initially
every three (1968–1970) or six (1971–1974) months [40–44].
The proactive case detection program that was initiated in 1960
continued during POR and included two key interventions: 1)
fever surveys in residual transmission foci, and 2) a passenger
screening program to manage the continued importation of
parasites into the country. Field workers based at the 13 regional
health offices operated the screening program and were respon-
sible for contacting passengers arriving from malaria endemic
areas within 48 hours after arrival to collect a blood smear,
household information, and recent travel history. The field
workers then followed up with recurrent visits every 14 days for
six weeks, each time taking a blood smear for diagnosis to the
malaria-dedicated laboratory [8]. In 1969, 20,411 blood slides
were taken from incoming passengers that arrived directly from
malaria-endemic countries or those who had been in a malaria-
endemic country within the previous six months [41]. Of these
passengers, 92.6% were visited once by a field worker, but only
26.8% were monitored for the full 42-day surveillance period. On
average, passenger screening alone – excluding other active case
detection activities (i.e. fever surveys) and passive case detection –
detected 43% of all positive malaria cases during POR [40–42].
Reintroduction and elimination, 1975–1997
Local P. vivax transmission was reestablished in 1975 with an
outbreak that began in a village just outside the capital, Port Louis,
with 41 cases identified in a community of migrant workers [45].
The majority of these positive cases were found among workers
from malaria-endemic India who came to help rebuild the island
after considerable damage from a cyclone (Figure 1) [46]. From
these initial cases, the outbreak increased to 668 cases and resulted
in endemic transmission that continued for 23 years [28,47–49].
The fact that the importation of parasites by migrant workers led
to such resurgence is often attributed to new and ubiquitous
breeding sites created by the results of the cyclone [38,45]. In
addition, however, it is important to consider two factors that may
have contributed to resurgence: 1) lax interventions, including
surveillance and vector control following the first elimination
campaign, and 2) increased importation risk beyond that posed by
migrant workers.
A WHO report noted that malaria-free certification in 1973
‘‘was certainly responsible for a relaxation in case detection
activities… And the integration of the malaria services into the
preventive health services further contributed to the weakening of
the surveillance mechanism,’’ [50] and the head of the Malaria
Control Unit at the time agreed with these sentiments [38].
Surveillance and laboratory staff was deemed to be half of what
Table 1. Surveillance definitions.
Passive case detection Involves a system in which data are routinely received by a central health authority based on a set of
rules and laws that need a health-care provider or health facility to report some diseases or disorders on
an ongoing basis and at specific intervals [29]
Reactive case detection Is triggered whenever a case is identified by passive case detection and involves visiting the household
of the locally acquired case, screening family members, and screening neighbors within a defined radius
[30]
Proactive case detection (e.g. passenger screening) Involves the screening of focal populations without the trigger of a passively identified case based on
the knowledge that transmission is more likely during some periods of the year, in specific high-risk
groups, or in target geographical areas [30]
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023832.t001
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the program required [50]. Cooperation with health workers was
lacking completely—passive surveillance was virtually absent in
1975 with health workers unwilling to routinely test for malaria at
health facilities [13]. Until a programmatic shift in 1982, it took
nine days for blood smears taken in the field to be delivered to the
malaria laboratory (while newspapers published in Port Louis
reached the entire island in three hours) [51].
At the same time, the island’s An. arabiensis density increased
substantially as the presence of breeding sites multiplied, with the
prevalence of anophelines indoors climbing from 0.4% in 1967 to
28% in 1972 [52]. These increases were likely due in part to
cyclonic disruption, but may have also been the product of
reduced vector control measures after malaria-free certification,
especially IRS that was limited to only hundreds of households and
ports of entry in the early 1970s [13]. In addition, it is possible that
development contributed to this heightened receptivity: new
housing structures with concrete flat rooftops—a reflection of
major economic development at the time—were built throughout
the island and contributed to increased vector density as pools of
water conducive to anopheline breeding would collect and
stagnate on these rooftops [53].
An increase in the rate of malaria importation may also have
contributed to reemergence [13]. The number of arrivals steadily
increased from 1933 but jumped substantially in the early 1970s
with an almost fourfold increase from 1968 to 1975 [54], possibly
due to increased demand for labor for a major economic
development plan initiated in 1970 [55]. The majority of these
visitors were from malaria-endemic areas, predominately main-
land sub-Saharan Africa and India [56].
After the epidemic peaked in 1982 with 623 indigenous cases
[57], local transmission was reduced to zero by 1990 with a
combination of focal IRS, widespread larviciding, passenger
screening, and an extensive case response system with every case
parasitologically diagnosed by the reestablished malaria-dedicated
laboratory [51]. Two small outbreaks in 1992 and 1996 followed,
with the last indigenous case recorded in 1997 [12] as shown in
Figure 1. Since 1998, Mauritius has maintained the absence of
local transmission despite the continued presence of An. arabiensis
and ongoing importation of malaria parasites [28].
Prevention of reintroduction, 1998-present
The current POR program consists of three principal
components that were in place in past programs but are arguably
more robust today: first, the continuation of the passenger
screening program; second, an Integrated Vector Management
(IVM) strategy; and third, a strong health system that passively
detects and responds to missed imported or introduced malaria
cases.
The proactive passenger screening program traces an average of
175,000 incoming passengers arriving each year [28] who meet at
least one of the inclusion criteria: traveling from malaria-endemic
countries, report having been in a malaria-endemic country in the
Figure 1. Key indicators throughout elimination and prevention of reintroduction in Mauritius, 1948–2008. Abbreviations: ABER -
Annual Blood Examination Rate, IRS - Indoor Residual Spraying, POR - Prevention of Reintroduction.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023832.g001
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last six months, and/or those who report being febrile upon arrival
[31] - the same criteria used since 1960. On average, 79% of
passengers are contacted by visit or phone at least once by health
surveillance officers (21% leave the country prior to contact or are
untraceable) and 38% of passengers are under surveillance for the
full 42-day surveillance period [28]. Longer surveillance is
conducted for migrant workers since many originate from endemic
areas, with health surveillance officers visiting monthly after the
fourth formal follow-up visit for a total of three months [personal
communication - Rawoteea]. Blood slides collected from these
passengers are sent to the public malaria-dedicated laboratory,
staffed by nine trained malaria microscopists, for diagnosis.
Average annual blood examination rate (ABER) between 2005
and 2008 was 3.4% [28] (Figure 1). While there are more
surveillance officers per 100,000 population compared to the first
POR program, the number of officers per incoming passengers
from malaria endemic regions has declined over time, as has the
fraction of all cases detected through passenger screening—the
first likely due to an increased number of arrivals each year and
the latter potentially due to a strengthened passive surveillance
system (Table 2).
The current IVM strategy focuses on routine island-wide
larviciding with temephos conducted in two-week cycles. IVM
targets former malaria foci, breeding sites with high density of
anopheles larvae identified during entomological surveillance, and
high-risk areas around migrant workers’ residences. New breeding
sites are continuously identified by entomological surveillance and
health inspections and are regularly added to the list for targeted
larviciding. Individuals and villages are charged with the
responsibility of looking after their environment and are managed
by health inspectors who have Power of Entry granted by the
country’s Public Health Act of 1925 that permits them to legally
require residents to remove breeding places in or around their
residences [58].
Another integral component of Mauritius’s IVM strategy is
indoor and outdoor residual spraying at and around the port and
airport with DDT or lambda cyhalothrin, a synthetic pyrethroid,
every six months. Overall, national entomological surveillance
data from 2004 to 2007 indicates zero presence of anophelines
indoors and very low densities outdoors [59].
Passive case detection has also strengthened substantially
compared to the first POR period as health workers have become
increasingly participatory in screening patients and promptly
sending blood smears to the malaria laboratory for diagnosis [60].
Passive case detection identifies an average of 47% of cases each
year [28].
All slides are read by the malaria laboratory within 24 hour-
s[personal communication – Lam], and identification of a malaria
case leads to immediate treatment. Reactive case detection is
triggered as part of an extensive case response system for all
positive diagnoses and includes case investigation, contact tracing,
and fever surveys. Larviciding and IRS, inspections of potential
breeding sites, and health education of households on malaria risks
to increase awareness and prevent further transmission are also
conducted within a 500 meter radius of a case’s residence and any
other residence where the case stayed 18–24 days prior to
diagnosis [61].
Costs and capacity
As described in Figure 2, annual per capita cost of the current
POR program is $2.06 (in 2008 dollars) or 0.83% of public health
expenditure, a significant reduction from costs during elimination
and also lower than the $2.99 per capita spent during the first
POR period (9% of public health expenditure). As described in the
methods, because phases were defined by strategy and combina-
tion of interventions, 1960 costs are categorized as POR. Figure 2
also illustrates the strategic shift from prevention activities to
surveillance that is represented by expenditure proportional to
each intervention during the recent elimination and current POR
periods. Surveillance comprised an average 28% of annual
expenditure during elimination but now amounts to 42% of total
annual costs while prevention-related costs (i.e. vector control,
environmental management, IEC, and prophylaxis) declined from
63% of total expenditure during elimination to 34% during POR
today. Per capita costs for passenger screening and vector
control—the two primary interventions over time—during
elimination were $1.19 and $1.57 and during POR are $0.70
and $0.62, respectively. The Mauritius government was and
continues to be the primary funder, although the World Health
Organization has been contributing financial and other resources
since the 1960s.
Table 3 demonstrates that the current POR program spends
proportionally more on personnel (90% of total expenditure)
compared to earlier periods, which had nearly equivalent spending
for consumables and personnel. Despite integration, this POR
effort remains personnel intensive with close to 400 people
spending a proportion of their time on malaria-related activities (or
274 FTEs) although this is less than was required for either
elimination campaign. Skilled labor constituted an average 22% of
the workforce during elimination compared to 61% during POR.
Costs per FTE are highest during the current POR at
approximately $9,000, which currently includes an approximately
100-person surveillance staff and 100-person vector control staff,
all spending close to 100% of their time on malaria-related
activities.
Table 2. Surveillance indicators for active case detection.
Elimination II2 POR I POR II
Indicator average 1982–88 1960–61 1990–91 2008
# surveillance officer/incoming passengers from malaria
endemic regions/1,000 population1
5.7 2.4 2.1 0.5
# surveillance officer/district 19.4 5.6 15 11.1
# surveillance officer/100,000 population 17.9 6.1 13.0 8.1
% positives detected by passenger screening 47.7 58.0 – 25.9
1Extrapolated the number of passengers from endemic regions from 2005–2008 data.
2The passenger screening program began after Elimination I during POR (Prevention of Reintroduction).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023832.t002
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Evaluating the impact of POR surveillance measures
Data on the number of malaria cases identified each year were
obtained since 1948, but detailed records of the means of detection
were only available for 2005–2008. Of the 36 cases identified on
average annually over this 4-year period, an average of 9 cases per
year (26%) were detected each year through examination of blood
taken from incoming passengers, while an average of 17 cases per
year (47%) were identified passively in public and private clinics,
and an average of 10 cases per year (27%) were detected through
reactive case detection. These 27 cases identified by passive or
active case detection after they had arrived in the country thus
indicate than an approximate minimum of 27/36 cases (74%)
were missed by the passenger screening program.
Although each of the infections identified by screening will lead
to some risk of onwards transmission, this risk is minimized
assuming that cases were promptly identified and treated in line
with established protocols. Beyond the 74% of cases missed by
passenger screening but identified by other case detection means,
however, it is probable that additional cases escaped detection by
all of these procedures due to imperfect sensitivity of screening or
testing algorithms and microscopy, and thus had greater
opportunity to lead to local transmission. Given assumptions
Figure 2. Total and per capita program costs, 1948–2008. *The bars reflect real data on expenditure per intervention while the lighter shading
is extrapolated based on averages from 1982–1988. Literature indicates a similar allocation of funds, although surveillance-attributed expenditure
was probably proportionally higher around 1960 due to a change of strategy with a new focus on surveillance. This figure indicates that the cost of
malaria control dropped steadily since 1982, with per capita costs dropping faster than total costs due to growing population size (NB different
vertical scales).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023832.g002
Table 3. Costs and capacity of workforce.
Elimination I1 Elimination II POR I2 POR II
Expenditure category average 1948–51 average 1982–88 1960–61 1990–91 2008
Personnel 46% 83% 51% 93% 90%
Consumables and equipment 54% 16% 49% 6% 10%
Total workforce
(% skilled vs. % unskilled)
614 (21% vs. 79%) 1,338 (23% vs. 77%) – 534 (27% vs. 73%) 384 (61% vs. 39%)
Number of FTEs2 614 684 – 465 274
FTE/100,000 population 132 69 – 45 24
Average annual expenditure per FTE $1,673 $6,748 – $6,403 $9,161
1It was not possible to calculate full time equivalents (FTEs) for the first elimination period so the full staff was used. However, planning documents from the campaign
indicate that most staff were engaged directly in the three year campaign.
2While total expenditure for personnel was available for 1960–1961 in technical reports on the elimination program, exact figures for total workforce and FTEs were not
available.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023832.t003
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about the sensitivity of tests and the completeness of qualifying
criteria, it was estimated that an average of 86% of infections were
missed by passenger screening, with a 95% CI of 80–89% (more
than 90% of this variance was related to the assumed sensitivity of
microscopy). This high fraction of imported infections missed by
passenger screening is largely attributable to the low testing rate:
although 148,642 incoming passengers were visited by health
surveillance officers in 2008, only 36,538 slides were taken (24.6%)
as surveillance officers only test passengers who are symptomatic
within the 42-day surveillance period.
Records of malaria cases identified annually since the second
POR program began in 1998 indicate an average of 48 cases
identified by all means of detection each year. Assuming the same
case detection fractions as observed from 2005–2008, it may be
estimated that an annual average of 12 of these cases were
identified by passenger screening, 23 by passive case detection,
and 13 by reactive case detection. If 86% of cases were missed by
passenger screening, however, as calculated above, an estimated
74 infections escaped detection by passenger screening, of which
only 36 were identified annually by passive and reactive case
detection. It is thus estimated that about 38 cases (95% CI of 12–
61 cases) are unidentified, or missed by all case detection activities.
Dividing this figure by Mauritius’s average population from 1998–
2008 of 1.2 M produces an estimated importation of 0.03/1000/
year (0.01–0.05), assuming that the 48 cases identified by
surveillance activities contributed little additional risk or secondary
transmission beyond these cases that were not identified. If
passenger screening were halted, the 12 cases it currently identifies
annually on average would additionally enter the island; with an
estimated 49% subsequently identified by passive and reactive case
detection, a modest increase in effective importation of approx-
imately 6 infections per year could be expected.
Simulations of potential malaria transmission using these
importation rates and a range of RC values indicate a current
annual risk of secondary transmission of about 3% if RC= 0.1,
rising to 17% if RC=0.25 and 52% if RC= 0.5 (Figure 3). Given
the absence of local transmission in Mauritius over the past
decade, the true value of RC is thus most likely at the low end of
this range. The increase in effective importation estimated to result
from the cessation of the passenger screening would cause an
accompanying increase in the annual risk of secondary transmis-
sion of 1.7% to 7.5%, depending upon the value assumed for RC.
Discussion
Mauritius’s initial failure and current success in preventing the
reemergence of malaria provides a number of important lessons
for the effective maintenance of elimination. Unlike in the first
POR program, current efforts have succeeded in maintaining
elimination despite large cyclones in 1994 and 2002 that caused
costly damage ($81 million [62] and $50 million [63], respectively)
and an increase in the number of travelers arriving from endemic
countries [64]. Achieving this level of success has required
substantial operational effort, including a large number of FTEs
and a high level of sustained political and financial commitment.
Part of this effort includes an extensive case response system to
prevent introduced malaria cases following imported case
detection, requiring rapid mobilization of resources and personnel
at both district and national levels.
In part, the failure of the first POR program may be attributed
to weakening of the surveillance system. The passenger screening
system during the first POR program visited a higher percent of
incoming passengers than today, but historical anecdotes indicate
an underperforming program. The current program succeeds in
contacting a higher fraction of travelers from malaria endemic
countries repeated times, has improved operational capacity in
districts, and more surveillance officers per 100,000 population
(Table 1). The importation risk of 0.03 per 1,000 population per
year estimated here is significantly lower than that estimated for
the islands of Zanzibar – the only other known quantification of
Figure 3. Simulated annual risk of indigenous transmission in Mauritius with and without passenger screening at a range of
potential RC values.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023832.g003
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malaria importation [65]. Despite this relatively low risk,
maintenance of the passenger screening program is most likely
resulting in a reduction in risk of indigenous transmission of
approximately 1.7%–7.5% each year; since RC is assumed to be
low, the lower end of this range is more likely. Although modest,
the impact is significant once compounded over a decade (roughly
18% risk reduction) or longer, at a cost of $.70 per capita per year.
Until global eradication is achieved, most countries will always
face some risk of malaria resurgence. The objective of a POR
program in these countries is therefore not an absolute absence of
malaria transmission, but rather an acceptable level of resurgence
risk. To date, countries have set this objective implicitly,
implementing interventions without a clear discussion of the
baseline or targeted risk levels such as the passenger screening
program in Mauritius. As more – and poorer – countries establish
POR programs, this process should be formalized to ensure the
most efficient interventions are pursued. Techniques to do so are
commonly used in other fields and could be easily extended to
malaria. For example, policies and interventions to prevent the
introduction of zoonotic diseases and plant pests are designed
based on a process known as import risk analysis, which centers on
the country determining its baseline risk and acceptable risk target
for each pathogen [66]. Although countries would ideally set risk
targets through robust cost-benefit analysis, the complexity of this
analysis may rely most on qualitative assessments of the
implications of reintroduction of disease and the government’s
and public’s attitude towards those potential outcomes [67].
Thus while Mauritius’ passenger screening approach appears to
be a major investment for relatively low impact at first glance, it
may be acceptable spending if the country is risk averse. Mauritius
has not formally set a risk target for its POR program; however,
the government’s actions since it achieved elimination the second
time, including continued investment in the extensive surveillance
program, indicates a low tolerance for risk. This suggests that the
passenger screening program, with its moderate reduction in
resurgence risk, is generally acceptable in the Mauritian context
despite its relatively high costs and operational complexities. It is
important, however, that other countries carefully assess this
intervention in their own contexts before pursuing it as geographic
realities (e.g., large land borders with malaria endemic areas) or
higher risk tolerance (e.g., in poorer countries with many
competing health priorities) would dramatically reduce its value.
This assessment should ideally be part of a broader exercise to
identify the most efficient set of interventions to achieve each
country’s risk target (e.g., using cost-minimization analysis) as
other interventions such as improved passive surveillance may be
more cost-effective.
Beyond surveillance, the Mauritius experience indicates that
any expectation that spending can drop dramatically after
elimination is achieved is erroneous and, in a highly vulnerable
and receptive setting, could lead to rapid resurgence. Given that
the isolated island of Mauritius spends substantially to maintain
elimination, it is reasonable to expect that costs will be even higher
in mainland countries with porous borders.
In a higher income country like Mauritius that spends US$247
per capita on health [68], $2 per capita to prevent reintroduction
is viable. Mauritius’s average annual per capita costs during
elimination were nearly half that spent in Mayotte [69] and almost
$4 less on POR than in Reunion Island [70]. Further comparisons
of costs per phase are explained in more detail elsewhere [71]. In
most sub-Saharan African countries however, where per capita
expenditure is below US$100 and in some cases below US$20 [2],
that investment seems more challenging to secure and maintain
over a long period of time, especially once malaria is no longer
perceived as a public health problem [72]. Mauritius has been
financed almost entirely by domestic resources, with consistent
funding ensure by strong political will; countries receiving
substantial external funding may face greater challenges in
securing the necessary sustained resources.
Despite these caveats, Mauritius demonstrates that it is possible
to eliminate malaria and prevent its reintroduction with relatively
high receptivity and vulnerability but that areas with high
receptivity will likely need to maintain some form of control to
reduce and sustain low vector density, as the country has
exemplified by its ongoing larviciding and residual spraying
activities. Evidence also suggests it may be necessary to maintain
some malaria-specific capacity or a hybrid model of integration
into the broader health system in order to sustain robust
surveillance and vector interventions even though the WHO
recommends full integration [73].
As proactive case detection is a major cost driver of a POR
program and requires a large operational effort, there is a need
for greater examination of the cost-effectiveness of this
intervention. Although the current approach in Mauritius has
successfully prevented reintroduction, there is a dearth of
evidence on the design and cost of malaria surveillance to
effectively prevent reemergence and a need to assess whether
alternative strategies would be more cost-effective. This analysis
on Mauritius’s screening program is a first step, but a greater
understanding of the most effective approaches to surveillance is
needed as more countries design elimination and POR
programs.
Notwithstanding these important lessons from Mauritius, the
world knows disturbingly little about interventions to prevent the
reemergence of malaria in resource-poor countries. With a
growing volume of local and international resources allocated to
achieving elimination, it is imperative that countries be in a
position to sustain the benefits of that investment. To do so, they
require a nuanced understanding of their risk of resurgence and
the most cost-effective strategies to mitigate it. Additional robust
research to develop this understanding should accordingly be a
priority for institutions supporting elimination.
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